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1. Introduction
In this paper we investigate the link between the variability of real ex-
change rate and various optimum currency area (OCA) criteria such as trade
integration, openness, commodity export structure and correlation of out-
put. Real exchange rate is more volatile because of asymmetric shocks that
are more common when countries form an optimum currency area only to
a limited degree.
We use data from developed economies to examine this link, but in our
opinion the results are equally relevant to accession countries. Therefore
we provide some discussion on their optimal timing of euro adoption from
the point of view of the methodology applied here.
Traditional approaches estimate equilibrium real exchange rates and con-
sider factors such as terms of trade, foreign direct investment or trade struc-
ture. Here we follow a different methodology focusing on the second mo-
ment of real exchange rate. This approach is relevant for policy analysis,
too. Countries should look at their optimum currency area criteria to as-
sess costs and benefits when considering joining the monetary union as it
inter alia affects variations in real exchange rates. Nowadays, this is espe-
cially important for policy makers in new EU member countries and other
EU accession countries.
We find that the criteria pointed out by the literature on optimum cur-
rency areas indeed explain a considerable part of real exchange rate vari-
ation. These criteria include the correlation of output movements, degree
of trade integration, similarities in commodity structure of exports and
openness. In addition, we find that financial development and economic size
affect the volatility of real exchange rates. We control for participation in
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and also for some other institutional sett-
ings. Interestingly, the results indicate that ERM participation limits
the real exchange rate variation.
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the OCA theory and its criteria. Section 3 offers some empirical research of
the OCA theory. In section 4 we explain the real exchange rate approach
we use in our paper. Section 5 describes the data and the methodology used
in our analysis. In section6 and7 we provide empirical results from theOLS
and the IV estimation, respectively. Finally, in section 8 we summarise our
results and offer some concluding remarks.
2. The OCA Theory and its Criteria
The OCAtheory started with theseminal contributions by Mundell (1961),
McKinnon (1963), and Kenen (1969). Three main OCA criteria for mone-
tary integration arose from this debate. Mundell (1961) defined the mobi-
lity of factors of production including labor as the first criterion. High fac-
tor market integration and sufficient factor mobility within a group of
partner countries can reduce the need to alter real factor prices, and
the nominal exchange rate, between countries in response to disturbances.
If one country suffers a depression due to a negative shock, factors of pro-
duction may move from this country to another which is hit by a positive
shock. Hence, prices of these factors do not need to fall so sharply in the de-
pressed country and rise in the booming country. The factor mobility is then
able to compensate for the exchange rate changes.
The second criterion, designated by McKinnon (1963), is the degree of eco-
nomic openness. The higher the degree of openness the more changes in in-
ternational prices of tradables are likely to be transmitted to the domestic
cost of living. Also devaluation would be more rapidly transmitted to
the price of tradables and the cost of living, negating its intended effects.
Hence, the nominal exchange rate would be less useful as an adjustment
instrument for small open economies.
Kenen (1969) outlined the third criterion: the diversification in produc-
tion and consumption. A high diversification in production and consump-
tion diminishes the possible impact of shocks specific to any particular sec-
tor. Therefore diversification reduces the need for changes in the terms of
trade via the nominal exchange rate and provides “insulation” against a va-
riety of disturbances. More diversified partner countries are more likely to
endure small costs from forsaking nominal exchange rate changes amongst
them and find a common currency beneficial.
Other criteria include price and wage flexibility. When nominal prices and
wages are flexible between and within countries contemplating a common
currency, the transition towards adjustment following a shock is less likely
to be associated with sustained unemployment in one country and/or infla-
tion in another. This will lessen the need for nominal exchange rate ad-
justment. In this case the loss of direct control over the nominal exchange
rate instrument need not represent a cost. Price and wage flexibility are
particularly important in the very short run, when the factor mobility is
partly restricted, to facilitate the adjustment process following a shock. Per-
manent shocks will entail permanent changes in real prices and wages.
One very important criterion is the similarity of supply and demand
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ing their exchange rates fixed). Monetary and exchange rate policy cannot
be used as a stabilisation tool if a member country is, for example, hit by
an asymmetric shock. Hence, business cycles of countries considering cre-
ation of a currency area must be correlated to a large extent.
Fiscal transfers are part of a non-market based adjustment process.
The aim is the redistribution of financial transfers from relatively richer to
relatively poorer countries or from countries hit by a positive shock to coun-
tries hit by a negative shock. However, these two aims could be inconsis-
tent: a country hit by a positive shock could be at the same time a relatively
poorer country. Moreover, the system of fiscal transfers requires a certain
degree of political integration.
Another criterion, financial market integration, can reduce the need for
exchange rate adjustment. It allows, among other things, to cushion tem-
porary adverse disturbances through capital inflows (by borrowing from
surplus areas or decumulating net foreign assets that can be reverted when
the shock is over). Under a high degree of financial integration even mod-
est changes in interest rates would elicit equilibrating capital movements
across partner countries. This would reduce differences in long-term inte-
rest rates, easing the financing of external imbalances but also fostering
an efficient allocation of resources.
Similarities of inflation rates are also needed to create an OCA. External
imbalances can arise from persistent differences in national inflation rates
resulting, inter alia, from: disparities in structural developments, diversi-
ties in labor market institutions, differences in economic policies, and di-
verse social preferences. When inflation rates between countries are si-
milar over time, terms of trade will also remain fairly stable. This will fos-
ter more equilibrated current account transactions and trade, and reduce
the need of nominal exchange rate adjustment.1
The OCA theory provides a set of criteria that countries willing to pro-
ceed with monetary unification should satisfy in order to minimize the costs
of joining a monetary union, i.e. the cost of losing the independent mone-
tary policy and the exchange rate tool.
3. Eastern Eurozone Enlargement in the Context of the OCA
Theory
Soon before the final introduction of the European currency there were
negotiations on a further enlargement of the Eurozone to the Eastern and
Central European Countries (CEECs). The accession of ten CEECs to
the Eurozone is likely to happen within the next ten years and it is an im-
portant issue to assess whether these candidates are better or worse suit-
able for Eurozone membership than current participants.
Many of the empirical papers are focused on the correlation of economic
activity across current and potential monetary union members. Countries
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1 On the other hand, not all inflation differentials are necessarily problematic. A “catching up”
process by less developed candidate countries could lead to the Balassa-Samuelson effect until
the process is completed.that enter a monetary union are likely to experience dramatically different
business cycles than before. In part this will necessarily reflect the adop-
tion of a common monetary policy, but it will also be a result of closer in-
ternational trade with other members of the union. Closer international
trade could result in either tighter or looser correlations of national busi-
ness cycles.
In the field of empirical research, one of the most important contributions
is the paper of Frankel and Rose (1998). The authors argue that some of
the OCA criteria are endogenous and are likely to converge once the coun-
tries join the monetary union. These criteria are international trade and
business cycles. Frankel and Rose (1998, p. 1024) state, that: “[...] some
countries may appear, on the basis of historical data, to be poor candidates
for EMU entry. But EMU entry per se, for whatever reason, may provide
a substantial impetus for trade expansion; this in turn may result in more
highly correlated business cycles. That is, a country is more likely to satisfy
the criteria for entry into a currency union ex post than ex ante.”2 This hy-
pothesis is sometimes called the “endogeneity hypothesis”. Additionally,
Fidrmuc (2004) enriches theendogeneity hypothesis by showing empirically
that it is the degree of intra-industry trade rather than trade itself that in-
duces business cycle synchronization.
There is also another hypothesis which states that closer international
trade could result in looser correlations of national business cycles. Krug-
man (1993) argues that business cycles could become more idiosyncratic.
As countries become more integrated they will also specialize in the pro-
duction of those goods and services for which they have a comparative ad-
vantage. Members of a currency area would become less diversified and
more vulnerable to supply shocks. Correspondingly their incomes will be-
come less correlated, resulting in more idiosyncratic business cycles. There-
fore, if membership in a currency area does not appear optimal ex ante, it
will be even less optimal ex post. This is the well-known “Krugman spe-
cialization hypothesis”.
Moreover, there could exist other problems concerning joining the Euro-
zone. As a result of the convergence criteria, each EU member country will
have to peg its currency to the euro at least two years before joining the Eu-
rozone and be able to keep the exchange rate fluctuations within a maxi-
mum band of  15 % or preferably  2.25 % (i.e. participation in the ERM2).
During this period, national macroeconomic policy will be restricted only to
the extent that requires meeting the convergence criteria. However, after
joining the Eurozone a common monetary policy is entrusted to the Euro-
pean Central Bank and member countries consequently lose their inde-
pendence concerning this important stabilization tool including the ex-
change rate. In addition, due to the Stability and Growth Pact, there are
also limits on the extent to which fiscal policy can be used for macroeco-
nomic stabilization. Moreover, if prices and wages are not flexible, national
labor and financial markets are not sufficiently integrated in order to en-
sure good factor mobility, and system of fiscal transfers does not exist,
the only absorption mechanism is a similarity of supply and demand shocks
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2 The paper of Frankel and Rose (1998) is thus an application of the well-known Lucas Critique.and business cycles of currency union member countries. Countries that are
exposed to symmetric shocks tend to have more synchronized business cy-
cles and thus similar policy preferences.
There are many approaches for assessing a country’s readiness to join
a currency union: for example, correlation of supply and demand shocks,
correlation of business cycles, convergence of monetary policy and the OCA
index (structural convergence). These four approaches are interesting espe-
cially in the context of the above-mentioned endogeneity hypothesis and
correlation of economic activity. For a detailed survey of these studies see
(Kuãerová, 2005). There are other suitable approaches as well, for example
approaches that include labor mobility surveys, production diversification
analyses, portfolio diversification analyses or nominal and real convergence.
4. The Real Exchange Rate Variability Approach
According to Mundell (1973), the currency unions are beneficial for
the member countries as regards dealing with the volatility of real exchange
rate. However, he also stresses that the possibility of future relative price
changes (appreciation/depreciation) brings uncertainty into the world eco-
nomy. Therefore, Mundell also emphasizes that the benefits from the com-
mon currency may be limited if the adoption creates large movements in
prices. Thus, it seems reasonable that ideal candidates for the common cur-
rency should form an optimum currency area to a high degree.
According to Vaubel (1976, p. 40), the crucial criterion is the variability
of the real exchange rate since “real exchange rate changes are clearly mea-
surable and automatically give the appropriate weights to the economic
forces of which they are the result”. Gros and Hobza (2003) also measure
the real exchange rate flexibility and find it an informative OCA criterion:
“[...] when we observe that the real exchange rate between two currencies
is stable, it could be argued that in these two countries there were not many
(asymmetric) shocks that required real exchange rate changes” (p. 10).
In addition, a growing body of literature also shows it may not be appro-
priate to look at putative official exchange rate regimes as they differ from
de facto regimes. Von Hagen and Zhou (2002) examine the choice of the ex-
change rate regimes in 25 transition economies and find discrepancies be-
tween official and actual (de facto) exchange rate regimes. This gives fur-
ther support for the methodology applied here.
In our paper, we follow this line of distinction between de jure and de facto
and apply methodology introduced by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997).
This methodology fully accounts for two essential issues: It models the ac-
tual exchange rate regimes and themultiple interdependencies among coun-
tries. Nevertheless, while Bayoumi and Eichengreen present only estimates
with nominal exchange rates, we work with real exchange rates.
5. Data 
We examine the determinants of bilateral real exchange rate variability
for 20 developed countries. These are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
257 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 55, 2005, ã. 5-6Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, and the USA.3 The data sample contains twenty countries for the pe-
riod from 1989 to 1998, which we label for convenience as representing
the 1990s.
The regression equation we estimate is as follows:
VOLij =   +  Xij +  FINij +  ERMij +  DOLVARij +  EUcoreij + eij (1)
The regressand in equation (1) stands for the bilateral exchange rate vari-
ability. Xij represents a vector of optimum currency area (OCA) variables,
namely the asymmetry of business cycles [SD( yi– yj)], trade linkages
(TRADEij), dissimilarity of export commodity structure (DISSIMij), open-
ness (OPENij) and economic size (SIZEij), all between country i and j. FINij
assesses the level of financial development and ERMij is a dummy variable
that takes on the value 1, if both country i and j participate in ERM.4
DOLVARij captures the effect of the variability of the U.S. dollar. The
EUcoreij dummy assesses the hypothesis of significantly higher economic
convergence among the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Germany,
Netherlands and Switzerland.
We calculate bilateral real exchange rate variability as:
pi
*
VOLij = STDEV d log(eij –––)   (2) pj
VOLij is the standard deviation of the change (d) from the month t to t+1
in the logarithm of nominal exchange rate (eij) between countries i and j. Pi
*
stands for foreign price level, while Pi is domestic price level.5 Optimum cur-
rency area variables are constructed as follows: SD( yi– yj) is the standard
deviation of the difference in the logarithm of real output between i and j,
DISSIMij is the sum of the absolute differences in the shares of agricultural,
mineral, and manufacturing trade in total merchandise trade, TRADEij is
the average of the ratio of bilateral exports to domestic GDP for the given
two countries, SIZEij is the mean of the logarithm of the two GDPs mea-
sured in U.S. dollars and OPENij is an arithmetic mean of the i-th and j-th
country ratio of trade (export + import) to its GDP. FINij is constructed as
an average of the ratio of broad money to corresponding GDP again bilate-
258 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 55, 2005, ã. 5-6
3 We exclude Greece due to the lack of data.
4 Even if one of the countries did not participate in ERM over the whole sample period (such as
Finland or Italy), the value of dummy is one. We collected data on variable VOLij and FINij
from IMF’s IFS online, SD( yi –  yj) was computed from the World Bank databases, TRADEij
was calculated using the Directions of Trade – IMF and the World Bank databases, variable
DISSIMij from the Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade – OECD and SIZEij and OPENij from
the World Bank data.
5 Alternatively, internal real exchange rate (the ratio of tradable to non-tradable prices) could
be used. In the case of “catching-up” countries, modeling the tradable and non-tradable price
dynamics might be of special importance – see (Coricelli – Jazbec, 2004) due to the presence of
the Balassa-Samuelson effect. Nevertheless, the results of Alberola and Tyrvainen (1998) indi-
cate that for developed European countries this effect is weak and thus we opt for equation (2)
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rally for country iand j. DOLVARijis simply anarithmetic average of thevaria-
bility of the U.S. dollar exchange rates for each country pair. DOLVARij takes
on a zero value when USA is one of the pair of the countries.
All original data are of quarterly frequency (end of period data are used).
However, we take average or standard deviation of all the variables over
time (as apparent from the above description). As a result, our final data
matrix is cross-sectional. Given that the data are bilateral, the mathema-
tical combination of bilateral relationships among 20 countries leads to
190 observations in our data matrix.
We estimate all our cross-sectional equations by OLS at first. However,
it is reasonable to suspect some of the explanatory variables in the ana-
lyzed equations to be endogenous. For example, more volatile exchange rate
changes may affect the trade integration as well as asymmetry of shocks.
As a result, standard OLS estimates are inconsistent. Hence we instrument
the equations in the attempt to eliminate this inconsistency. We draw our
set of instruments from the gravity models.6 Nevertheless, this is not
the whole story. Even if the instruments are exogenous, they may be weak.
Consequently, this increases the asymptotic standard errors and reduces
the power of hypothesis tests.
Recently, there have been enormous advancements in the understanding
of validity of instruments when there is more than one endogenous regres-
sor. Several papers address the issue and propose how to test formally for
the extent of correlation between the instruments and the included en-
dogenous variables in the linear instrumental variable (IV) regressions.
Horvath (2005) discusses these issues in greater detail.
Because our data does not fulfil the requirements for the other test such
as those proposed by Hahn and Hausmann (2002) or Stock and Yogo (2003),
we provide Shea’s measure of relevance of instruments.
Shea (1997) proposes to compute the sample partial R2 for each endoge-
nous regressor. Unfortunately his approach lacks any distributional theory,
but may serve as a rule of thumb. E.g. there is a finding by Devereux and
Lane (2003) that partial R2 for some of their endogenous regressors is close
to zero, suggesting the presence of weak instruments.
In this regard, it is interesting to note the following. Weimann (2003) ar-
gues that this methodology may entail some econometric difficulties. He
claims that there are censored as well as uncensored dependent variables.
Nominal exchange rates are bounded by fluctuation margins in ERM, while
free elsewhere. However, Serrat (2000) shows that the volatility in multi-
lateral target zones may increase as compared to free float. Hence, one may
argue that this issue does not necessitate a problem.
6. Results – OLS Estimation
In this section we provide an estimation of determinants of real exchange
rate variability by the OLS method. First, we present the results in Table 1.
6 Most of these instruments we downloaded from the website of Andy Rose: www.haas.berke-
ley.edu/~arose.R-squared is high, all coefficients yield the expected signs and almost all
variables are significant (measured by t-Statistic).
According to our results from Table 1, variability of output has a strong
and significant effect on real exchange rate variability. Thus, the cyclical
fluctuations of output had an adverse impact on real exchange rate move-
ments in the 1990s. Therefore, economic cooperation between the countries
(especially monetary union member countries) is of high importance to pre-
cede large real exchange rate fluctuations. This finding is relevant also for
accession countries which intend to join the Eurozone as soon as possible,
because premature adoption of the euro could cause high real exchange rate
volatility and subsequently, bring higher uncertainty in development of re-
lative prices.
Other significant variables are trade linkages and dissimilarity of ex-
ports. The positive role of international trade in the process of mone-
tary integration and its impact on business cycle correlation has been
inter alia emphasized by Frankel and Rose (1998b). Our results verify
that higher bilateral trade together with high similarity of exports led
to lower real exchange rate volatility in selected developed countries in
the 1990s. According to this, high trade integration with EU (especially
Eurozone) member countries could help accession countries to reduce
exchange rate fluctuations during and after the process of Eurozone in-
tegration.
Both openness and size of economy have a significant effect on real ex-
change rate variability. With increasing openness of the economy the real
exchange rate variability decreases. Open economies are cautious about
their competitiveness, and central banks sometimes implicitly target real
exchange rates. In the case of size of economy the dependence was positive:
relatively large economies faced higher real exchange rate volatility than
relatively small economies. This is understandable. Small economies influ-
ence terms of trade only to a limited extent. The independence of their mo-
netary policy is limited as well.
In this regard, these results look favorable for accession countries because
the majority of them are small and open economies. According to these
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TABLE 1 Determinants of Real Exchange Rate Variation 
(1) (2) Variable
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
Variability of output 0.17 3.57 0.22 4.38
Trade linkages –0.02 –3.29 –0.02 –3.79
Dissimilarity of exports 0.01 2.83 0.01 2.76
Openness –0.0002 –4.32
Size of economy 0.005 4.22
Financial development 2E-09 4.46 2E-09 5.6
Variability of dollar 0.03 1.52 0.06 2.94
ERM 0.002 0.45 –7E-05 –0.02
EU core –0.01 –7.03 –0.01 –7.1
R-squared 0.63 0.63
Note: White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and CovarianceOCA criteria, adoption of the euro single currency will thus be beneficial
for accession countries in the long run, as measured by real exchange rate
variability.
As regards financial development the coefficient is significantly positive
albeit very low. (However, one has to be cautious about the value of re-
gression coefficients, as OLS may in fact be inconsistent. We tackle this is-
sue in the next section). In the world of unrestricted capital movements and
global financial markets this finding is somewhat surprising. It suggests
that higher level of financial development is accompanied by greater vari-
ations in real exchange rates, but it may be a consequence of using the ra-
tio of M2 to GDP as a proxy.
ERM membership does not seem to have an effect on real exchange rate
variability. When accounting for endogeneity of explanatory variables, we
find that ERM limits the real exchange rate variation (see the next section).
On the contrary, variability of dollar seems to be significant in OLS esti-
mation and its significance varies when estimated by GMM. Naturally,
larger movements in USD generate more variation in bilateral real ex-
change rates.
Results in the case of dummy EU core confirm that higher economic con-
vergence between the EU core countries reduced the exchange rate fluctu-
ations among these countries in the 1990s.
We have further estimated regressions, in which we have excluded dummy
ERM and included dummy Europe instead. The results are given in Table 2.
R-squared increased and all variables, except for size of economy, are sig-
nificant. Hence this model seems to explain real exchange rate variability
even better.
The new dummy Europe is significant and explains real exchange rate
variability in the analyzed countries in the 1990s better than dummy ERM
when estimated by OLS. According to our results, European countries ex-
perienced lower bilateral real exchange rate fluctuations than non-Euro-
pean countries. So the “economic” borders of the EU contain also non-EU
Western European countries included in our sample. This is appealing as
Switzerland and Norway value the stability of their currencies, because
they are highly integrated by trade with EU economies. Lastly, variability
261 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 55, 2005, ã. 5-6
TABLE 2 Determinants of Real Exchange Rate Variation with dummy Europe 
(1) (2)
Variable
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
Variability of output 0.19 5.21 0.19 4.78
Trade linkages –9E-03 –2.14 –0.01 –2.11
Dissimilarity of exports 0.006 3.13 0.006 2.99
Size of economy 3.1E-04 0.30
Openness –7E-05 –2.01
Financial development 1.3E-09 4.67 1.4E-09 3.97
Variability of dollar 0.09 4.42 0.1 4.54
EU core 0.007 2.26 0.006 1.85
Europe dummy –0.03 –13.8 –0.03 –13.7
R-squared 0.78 0.77
Note: White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covarianceof output, dissimilarity of exports, and variability of dollar remain signifi-
cant.
As regards the effect of trade linkages, openness, and EU core variables,
the coefficients are all significant albeit relatively small in size. Neverthe-
less, these variables help to explain real exchange rate fluctuations in se-
lected developed countries in the 1990s. Notice that dummy EU core has
an opposite sign. This further suggests that instrumenting the equation
may be a good idea. Indeed, we find that the EU core variable does not help
in explaining bilateral real exchange rate variations in line with Fidrmuc
and Korhonen (2003). Fidrmuc and Korhonen argue that it is difficult to
find substantial differences between so-called EU core and EU periphery
countries. In contrast to the previous results the size of economy does not
seem to play an important role in explaining real exchange rate variabi-
lity.
Nevertheless, if explanatory variables are correlated with the error term,
OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent. That is why we apply an in-
strumental variables estimation in the next section.
7. Results – IV Estimation
In this section we provide an estimation of the determinants of real ex-
change rate variation by the generalized method of moments (GMM). This
is because there is good reason to believe that movements in real exchange
rates influence the degree of trade integration, openness, correlation of out-
put movements and variability of USD.
For this reason we perform a Hausman specification test and indeed find
that these four variables are endogenous (p-value of the test was 0.0002).
We instrument the exogenous variables by the following set of instruments:
log (distance) and its square, regional trade agreement dummy, common
language dummy, common border dummy, size of the economies, USA
dummy and exogenous variables.
First of all, we assess the relevance of the instruments. When instru-
ments are not informative for endogenous variables, the estimated re-
gression coefficients, while consistent, may be severely biased. We docu-
ment this issue below. We apply Shea’s measure of relevance of instru-
ments. This approach lacks any distributional theory, but still may locate
the presence of weak instruments.7 Table 3 indicates that the instruments
for variability of output are not very informative, as the corresponding 
R-squared is considerably low. Indeed, when we include the variability of
output in our instrumental variables estimation, the results do not look
convincing. Some regression coefficients have the “wrong sign” and the fit
is poor. As a result, we exclude variability of output movements in our
GMM estimation.
Next, we perform a test for overidentifying restrictions (Sargan’s test). In
any case we cannot reject the null hypothesis at any reasonable level of sig-
262 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 55, 2005, ã. 5-6
7 Unfortunately, any other existing test for the presence of weak instruments is not applicable
for our data.263 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 55, 2005, ã. 5-6
Table 1-2 Trade links Variability of output Openness USD variability
Equation (1) 0.41 0.08 0.23 0.64
Equation (2) 0.44 0.05 – 0.67
Note: Shea’s partial R-squared. Columns (1) and (2) from tables 1-5 are not reported.
TABLE 3 Relevance of Instrumental Variables
TABLE 4 GMM Estimation of Determinants of Real Exchange Rates Variation
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
Trade linkages -0.03 -3.8 -0.04 -5.21
Dissimilarity of exports 0.005 1.80 0.002 0.97
Openness -0.0003 -5.64
Size 0.006 5.63
Financial development 3E-09 7.28 4E-09 12.5
Variability of dollar 0.01 0.41 0.015 0.53
EU core 0.0001 0.03 -0.003 -1.09
ERM -0.006 -3.18 -0.005 -3.12
J-statistic 0.021 0.014
Note: White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance
nificance and thus instruments are possibly uncorrelated with theestimated
error term.8
We report the result for IV estimation in Table 4 and 5.
Beginning with the estimates from Table 4, the importance of openness,
size of economy, trade linkages, and financial development also slightly in-
creased as measured by the value of regression coefficients. Our results con-
firm some of the conclusions of the OCA theory. According to McKinnon
(1963), for small and open economies it is preferable to fix their exchange
rate. Interestingly, the level of financial development increases the real ex-
change rate variability. 
With the GMM estimation the effect from participation in ERM becomes
negative and significant. Thus, GMM estimation reveals a positive role
played by ERM membership in reducing the real exchange rate fluctuations
during the 1990s.
There are three variables that are not significant in the specification in
Table 4: dissimilarity of exports, variability of dollar, and dummy EU core.
It is noteworthy that Horvath (2005) finds that the variability of the dollar
influences bilateral nominal exchange rate variability. This would suggest
that price movements offset the effect of USD on local currency. Using
the second specification (in Table 5) the issue is less clear, as the variabi-
lity of the dollar becomes significant. Also, dissimilarity of export commo-
dity structure seems to be significant at a 10% significance level in Table 5.
Table 5 reports our results again after dropping dummy ERM from the es-
timated equations and including dummy Europe using the GMM estima-
8 We present the J-statistic in Table 4 and 5. Multiplying this statistic by the number of obser-
vations and comparing with the  -square distribution is Sargan’s test. The degrees of freedom
are equal to the overidentifying restrictions, i.e. the difference between the number of instru-
ments and parameters.tion. TheEuropedummyremains significant in our GMM estimation though
the value of the coefficient is lower than in our OLS estimation. Still it has
a large impact on the real exchange rate fluctuations measured by the value
of theregression coefficient. European countries thus experienced lower real
exchange rate fluctuations than non-European countries.
8. Conclusions
This paper contributes to the discussion concerning the applicability of
the OCAtheory. We link OCAcriteria with bilateral real exchange rate vari-
ation. We find that OCA criteria such as trade linkages, openness and size
of economy or financial development explain a substantial part of real ex-
change variability. We do not find clear evidence that variability of the dol-
lar had an effect on the real exchange variability in the analyzed countries
in the 1990s. Also, the significance of the dissimilarity in export commo-
dity structure varies, but still it seems that larger export similarities limit
real exchange rate volatility. ERM participation is associated with lower
real exchange rate variation either due to credibility effect of target zones
or convergence of the participating economies. The observation holds even
if we include the other European countries in the ERM variable. On the con-
trary, we find no evidence that the countries of the so-called EU core would
significantly differ from the remaining economies in terms of their real ex-
change rate variation.
We conclude that there is clear evidence that countries fulfilling optimum
currency area criteria tend less to have a bilaterally more volatile real ex-
change rate. Fulfilling OCAcriteria to a lesser degree may increase the dif-
ficulties in the conduct of monetary policy, as different inflation rates are
likely to occur across the monetary union. Therefore, there is a role for
OCA criteria in the timing and scenario of the forthcoming Eurozone en-
largement process and the monetary integration process in general.
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TABLE5 GMM Estimation of Determinants of Real Exchange Rates Variation with dummy Europe
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
Trade linkages –0.02 –4.46 –0.021 –4.29
Dissimilarity of exports 0.004 1.95 0.003 1.80
Openness –0.0001 –2.31
Size 0.002 1.96
Financial development 2E-09 8.27 2.84E-09 8.46
Variability of dollar 0.064 2.74 0.065 2.67
EU core 0.003 1.08 0.001 0.22
Europe dummy –0.016 –7.36 –0.016 –6.91
J-statistic 0.006 0.006
Note: White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and CovarianceREFERENCES
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SUMMARY 
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Real Exchange Rates and Optimum Currency Areas:
Evidence from Developed Economies
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In this paper, the authors link real exchange rates and optimum currency area
criteria. The authors examine the hypothesis that countries not fulfilling optimum
currency area criteria in full will tend to have volatile bilateral real exchange rate.
The authors find that, based on a study of data from developed economies from
the 1990s, optimum currency criteria (such as trade integration, asymmetry of
shocks, openness) help explain bilateral real exchange-rate variation.
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